Postscript: Thursday, May 1 2025

I woke up on mayday and texted Ayse good luck. I didn’t initially hear back, but I hadn’t expected to. Two days later, I got a reply - she’d been in custody, snatched up in preventative raids with hundreds of others. The following text, originally published on the Umut Sen website, surveys the events.

Taksim struggle on May 1st

Mürsel Ünder

On May 1, 2025, the government mobilised all state apparatuses to close Taksim Square to the working class. While the ban was imposed by the governor’s office, the squares, which had been closed for years, were allocated to various unions, demonstrating blatant hypocrisy. This double standard was a clear expression of a policy of dividing and neutralising the will of the working class. Statements by opposition parties advocating for the lifting of the ban on Taksim Square (even by some factions within the government), Özgür Özel’s statements regarding Taksim Square, the growing public opposition to the increasing restrictions on public spaces since March 19th, and street protests spreading from high schools to universities all strengthened the possibility of celebrating May Day in Taksim Square this year. This strong possibility was also the reason why the state did not announce the ban until the last moment.

However, organisations like DİSK, KESK, TMMOB, and TTB abandoned the line of struggle by accepting the government’s “Kadıköy bribe,” significantly weakening the organising power of the streets. This choice undermined the potential for hundreds of thousands to flow to Taksim and created a significant rift in the struggle of the working class. This choice was not merely a mistake, but a significant indicator of the ongoing disintegration. The greatest obstacle on the road to Taksim was no longer the state itself, but rather such conciliatory choices. Reducing May 1st from a day of struggle to a controlled rally weakened the organised power of the working class in the streets and the flow to Taksim. The stance of TÜRK-İŞ and HAK-İŞ, who were at the beck and call of state and capital, was not surprising. What mattered to them was not the interests of the working class, but the government’s instructions.

After these organisations announced their response to the question, “Taksim, Kadıköy, or Kartal?”, the state’s efforts to attack and criminalise the Taksim decision reached a peak on May 1st. The state mobilised all its instruments to thwart the will of Taksim. The Taksim ban was imposed not only by a governor’s decree, but also through media manipulation, judicial tyranny, and systematic police violence. The ban was more an expression of political fear than a legal decision. The governor’s decision, along with the cancellation of public transportation services, the closure of all roads leading to Taksim with police barricades, the deployment of tens of thousands of police officers…

Despite all these difficulties, the decision of some organisations, particularly the May Day Organising Committee, to hold an organised celebration in Taksim Square was a powerful declaration of will that shook the existing order. A new will arose in the streets. The morning after the announcement, union leaders and organising committee members were detained, their homes raided. They were held hostage at the police and prosecutor’s offices throughout May 1st.

At the same time, social media posts pointing towards Taksim were criminalised, dozens of people were detained in house raids because of these posts, some of them were arrested, and judicial control orders issued for some.

According to ÇHD data, a total of 494 people were detained between April 28 and May 1. Almost half of these were detained in the days leading up to May 1 in order to weaken the will to march to Taksim. Detainees were kept waiting for hours, hungry, thirsty, and handcuffed. Lawyers attempting to meet with their clients were prevented and subjected to police violence. Statement taking took place in groups, under conditions detrimental to human dignity. Those brought to the courthouse were subjected to arrest or judicial control requests without even seeing the prosecutors’ faces, being allowed to meet with their lawyers, or being shown their files.

Courthouses were virtually surrounded, and even lawyers and members of parliament were barred from entering the corridors during statements before prosecutors and judges. Police and courthouse proceedings were clearly conducted under state of emergency conditions. Detainees were kept waiting in detention buses for hours, handcuffed and without food or water. Their lawyers were not even allowed into the police station and were subjected to police violence. Group client interviews were imposed, and statements were taken in groups of 15-20 people.

Pro-government media, the police, the governor’s office, and the prosecutor’s office used Taksim and terrorism discourses together to criminalise union leaders and managers, those who shared social media posts, and those who tried to go to Taksim.

The fact that some of the detentions were conducted by the terrorism unit and investigated by terrorism prosecutors was part of this vicious campaign. Dozens of people who shared Taksim posts on social media were subjected to similar injustices. Prosecutors issued arrest or judicial control orders without even seeing the faces of the detainees, without allowing them to meet with their lawyers for long hours, or even showing them their files.

Courthouses were surrounded by police barriers, corridors were closed to lawyers, and even members of parliament were barred from entering. Police and court proceedings were clearly conducted under a state of emergency.

In addition, the Kadıköy and Kartal rallies were smaller than expected. According to the governor’s office, these rallies, which drew around 30,000-35,000 people, fell far short of reflecting the true will and enthusiasm of the working class, and far short of generating political impact, both quantitatively and qualitatively.

May 1, 2025, demonstrated that the will of Taksim could not be broken, despite all oppression; on the contrary, it grew even stronger. In this scenario, despite all the pressure and this power asymmetry, the victors were those who resolutely defended the will of Taksim under all circumstances. Politically, this strong will manifested itself through widespread social legitimacy and the practical dynamism of the streets.

The organising committees, which abandoned the line of struggle in the name of “mass mobilisation,” remained silent in the face of prohibitions, bowed to state direction, and veered wherever the state commanded, no longer have the power or capacity to represent workers and labourers. The working class’s swift liberation from these “vanguards” will mean the removal of its greatest obstacle.

The working class possesses the potential to wage a highly dynamic and militant class struggle. It must develop a militant stance against the enslavement, poverty, and futurelessness imposed on it. The youth who have not left the streets since March 19th are also strengthening this will. True representation is possible by organising a legitimate struggle, continuing resistance, and refusing to recognise prohibitions: by resisting, refusing to recognize prohibitions, and actively defending the law. Only in this way can the combative character of May 1st be preserved.

It is among our fundamental duties to strengthen the will to defend Taksim, to build the actual and legitimate line of class struggle, and to disperse all the shadows that cover this line.